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Abstract—Epidemiology models play a key role in understand-
ing and responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. In order to
build those models, scientists need to understand contributing
factors and their relative importance. A large strand of literature
has identified the importance of airflow to mitigate droplets and
far-field aerosol transmission risks. However, the specific factors
contributing to higher or lower contamination in various settings
have not been clearly defined and quantified.
As part of the MOAI project (https://moaiapp.com), we are
developing a privacy-preserving test and trace app to enable
infection cluster investigators to get in touch with patients without
having to know their identity. This approach allows involving
users in the fight against the pandemic by contributing additional
information in the form of anonymous research questionnaires.
We first describe how the questionnaire was designed, and the
synthetic data was generated based on a review we carried out
on the latest available literature. We then present a model to
evaluate the risk exposition of a user for a given setting. We
finally propose a temporal addition to the model to evaluate the
risk exposure over time for a given user.
Index Terms—COVID-19, Machine Learning, Exposure Risk,
Epidemiology, Privacy, Confidential Computing
I. INTRODUCTION
Epidemic modelling is vital for understanding the evolving
transmission dynamics and responding to the ongoing pan-
demic. In particular, it is now well established that COVID-19
transmission commonly occurs in closed spaces. In the absence
of a large scale vaccination of the population with an effective
vaccine, non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) should be
identified and used extensively to reduce potential airborne
transmissions.
A variety of NPIs have been adopted worldwide based on
Centres for Disease Prevention and Control (CDCs) recom-
mendations. In common with many other countries, the UK
implemented a mass “stay-at-home” order; non-essential stores
have been closed, mandatory face masks in stores must be
worn, one way systems in stores have been put in place,
etc. All those NPIs are educated guesses based on prior viral
outbreaks and scientific knowledge on known transmissions
vectors for airborne viral diseases. That lack of knowledge
is illustrated by the sometimes divergent approaches countries
have taken to mitigate the propagation. For example, children’s
role in school settings resulted in many shifts in some countries
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(e.g. UK, Ireland, Germany or Denmark) of opening and clos-
ing over time in various countries based on evolving scientific
consensus. Some NPIs have proven counterproductive as well,
even though it might appear counter-intuitive, such as one
way systems [1]. Nevertheless, in the absence of a precise
understanding of the transmission mechanisms of COVID-19,
the NPIs put in place are fairly broad and coarse, which puts
more pressure on our economies, mental health and personal
liberties. In order to alleviate that pressure, a more precise
understanding of closed spaces exposure risks is necessary.
The modelling of airborne transmission in indoor spaces
fundamentally relies on the fluid mechanics modelling of
the transport of viral aerosols. In order to achieve accurate
modelling, understanding contributing factors is paramount. In
general, models studying airborne transmission risk fall into
one of two types: those based on the assumption of well-mixed
room (WMR) and models of computational fluid dynamics
(CFD). The WMR assumption is that virus-carrying aerosols
are spread uniformly across the room instantaneously [2], [3],
so that everyone in the room, regardless of their position,
is equally likely to be infected. By ignoring the complex
effects of airflow on the airborne particles, this assumption
greatly simplifies the problem, so the models can be incorpo-
rated into spreadsheets and are swift to run. That simplicity
and lightweightness allowed us to gain some insights on
COVID-19 propagation [4]–[6]. Various CFD simulations have
also investigated the transport of viral COVID-19 aerosols [7]–
[12]. CFD simulations are powerful tools to study airborne
transmission as they allow for fine-grain details such as the
room size, geometry, the complex turbulent airflow (e.g. open
windows or HVACs) and the size distribution of the aerosols,
such as in [7].
Nevertheless, those models are only as accurate as the
quality of the contributing factors considered. As part of the
MOAI project, we aim to identify those factors systematically
and propose a simpler approach to model the exposure risk
for all settings by only considering contributing risk factors
coupled with proven exposures from the NHS Test and Trace
program and not the airflow itself. To identify those factors,
we developed a user-based questionnaire integrated into the
MOAI app that would allow users and venues to contribute
a more accurate description of the airflow in the setting. We
then built an ensemble model which evaluates the likelihood
























Lastly, citizens’ concerns about data privacy and data secu-
rity breaches may reduce the adoption of COVID-19 contact
tracing mobile phone applications, making them less effec-
tive [13]. Studies [13]–[15] conducted in different countries
have highlighted the importance of centralised National Health
Service systems and a mixture of digital and human contact
tracing for a successful adoption and trust by the public.
The contributions of this paper are the following:
• We present MOAI’s modular and scalable architecture,
designed with a combination of security and privacy
features that allows contact tracing and risk of exposure
evaluation while preserving the participating users’ pri-
vacy (Section II).
• We detail the literature review conducted, which lead
to identifying potential contributing factors, the design
of the questionnaire, and the generation of the synthetic
exposure data (Section III).
• We propose an exposure risk model used by the platform
to provide feedback to the users on their current exposure
risk (Section IV).
II. MOAI: FEDERATED DATA COLLECTION AND
COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH
In this section, we provide an overview of the architecture
of the MOAI platform. The platform is divided in three
main parts: the mobile application, the web portal and the
Secretarium back end. The exposure data from the question-
naires is collected centrally from the app to the Secretarium
back end in an encrypted fashion for storage and compute
the risk of exposure in enclaves using the proposed model.
The Secretarium back end provides secure public APIs for
researchers to interact with the platform and secure web
services for health authorities’ teams to discuss with patients
in the eventuality of a confirmed contact (e.g. Test and Trace
teams in the UK).
Building software for NPIs initiatives can be a delicate polit-
ical, privacy and ethical exercise. Recommendations provided
by health protection agencies have not only been criticised
by academic experts [16], [17], there are multiple issues of
engagement sprawling from distrust from the general public
[17]. To make the matter worse, most recommendations are
region-centric in their legal framework and implementation,
thus preventing more efficient cross-nation collaborative ef-
forts. A notable exception can be made of PEPP-PT [18] but
it was met with a large amount of controversy [19] leading to
more academic driven initiatives such as DP-3T [20]. The lack
on consensus led to the creation of many different separate
applications [21] and left governments only with stringent
travel restriction strategies to stop the spread across borders.
This appears to be among the few measures that countries
all commonly implemented; with the drawback of hindering
people’s freedom and hugely impacting economies and mental
health issues in large swathes of the population.
A. The Secretarium platform
The Secretarium platform is the fruit of Blockchain, Trusted
Execution Environments (TEEs) and cryptography research
and developments. We leverage secure multi-party computing
techniques [22] and TEEs to achieve strong security and
privacy guarantees when data is at rest, in transit and in
use with multiple untrusted (potentially adversarial) parties.
Secretarium’s platform enables ’Code-Is-Law’ implementation
and is intended to satisfy some important properties:
Secure. The platform and data must be secure against
penetration attacks aiming to gain unauthorised access to data.
The Secretarium Communication Protocol (SCP) guarantees
that private and confidential data stays under the control of
their originator at all times. We follow the principle of end-
to-end encryption throughout the data’s life cycle; none of
Secretarium engineers or other node runners get access to the
data in clear-text.
Integrity-preserving. The platform’s results must be
tamper-proof, including the party performing the analysis (e.g.
Researchers) and must provably yield results as specified. This
mechanism is similar to the tamper-proof integrity mechanisms
available on a Blockchain. The MOAI application within the
Secretarium platform is hosted on an internet-like public net-
work. We have developed a Byzantine Fault Tolerant version
of the RAFT algorithm [23] to allow the application to run in
a distributed fashion without a single point of failure.
Privacy-preserving. Queries results should consist of ag-
gregated data or simple yes/no answers and never disclose
individuals private information stored in the ledger. In the
context of this project, the data available to the researchers
contains no personally identifiable field and the timestamp is
coarsened to fixed four hours windows (e.g. 0-4, 4-8, ..., 20-
24).
Flexible & Scalable. The platform must support a large
array of purposes. Data coupled with each application must
be segregated to maximise performance. The platform must
be multi-layered, modular, and scalable. The modularity of the
architecture and flexibility in the layers allows for horizontal
scaling of each layer independently and enables decoupled
upgrade, addition and removal of services with no downtime.
Simplicity. Secretarium’s protocol is designed to facilitate
integration with existing systems, especially to allow recent
commonly used internet browsers to serve natively as clients.
B. Security, privacy and compliance considerations
MOAI’s first and foremost goal is to design a solution
that does not infringe on participants’ privacy, be it of the
businesses and venues or the general public. Indeed, the
large adoption in the UK of the NHS COVID-19 app (more
than 5 million installations for Android alone as of March
2021) and the implication of large numbers of volunteers for
the Test and Trace teams creates a large surface of attack
for malicious insiders aiming at gaining some information
about users. For this reason, MOAI is not collecting any
personally identifiable data for it to provide a viable functional
level of operation. Data collected in the context of MOAI
Figure 1. A high-level schematic representation of the data flow of the MOAI
platform. The pale red Secretarium container represents a single enclave, many
are deployed to provide MOAI with sufficient fault tolerance and performance.
research questionnaires, while optional, are treated and stored
in the most secure fashions relying on confidential computing
leveraging Intel SGX enclaves. Best practices in auditing and
data provenance and usage tracking can also be ensured by
Secretarium technology’s guarantees on top of the Intel SGX
platform. By leveraging those guarantees, MOAI is compliant
with the requirements posed by regulations such as GDPR and
HIPPA by design.
C. Hardware Compatibility
Our approach took into consideration limitations pertain-
ing to participants devices. Indeed, many implementations
of such software NPIs relied on either utilising Bluetooth
beaconing techniques or what came to be known as the
Exposure Notification API (a collaboration between Apple and
Google to provided a cross-platform solution to the contract
tracing requirements of multiple government bodies [24]). In
addition to technical limitations (e.g. no guarantee that two
people in relative proximity are in the same room), both
these approaches have hardware and platform constraints that
limited their effectiveness. Eventually, projects like the NHS’s
COVID-19 mobile application pivoted to using QRCode-based
contract tracing, increasing the eligible hardware considerably.
This change, compounded with later terms and conditions of
use changes for the Exposure Notification API brought by
Apple and Google [25]; prompted us to envisage a similar
solution based on QRCodes.
D. NHS compatibility
While providing a robust privacy-preserving solution for
contact tracing, another central goal of MOAI is to increase
cross-agency collaboration. Our first step was to design a
solution that would extract information from existing “NHS-
COVID-19” QRCodes so that a large amount of existing
QRCodes can be leveraged. These QRCodes contain a colon-
separated set of clear text and base64 encoded RFC7515 JSON
Web Signature (JWS) object [26]. MOAI extracts the “id” and
“vt” members of the payload particle of the JWS data. “id”
referring to the unique identifier provided to the venue and “vt”
denoting its type. The venue type is then mapped to the types
of venue available in MOAI, naively extending the NHS list
(See Appendix B). The ID is ingested and treated as immutable
and unique. MOAI does not validate the signature of the token
from the ”NHS COVID-19” QRCodes as it does not have the
necessary private cryptography components and the veracity
of the ID is not relevant in this context.
E. Scalability
Relying on a ledger-based technology, even when powered
by data replication and load balancing, generates a significant
performance bottleneck when scaling to support hundreds of
thousands of simultaneous queries (new QR code scans by the
users, test and trace teams, chats, etc.). MOAI overcomes that
limitation by pooling data capture in ledger silos and allowing
cross-silo querying via a federated query layer. Nevertheless,
every silo follows the best practice of data replication across
multiple enclaves and leverages particular implementation of
consensus mechanism using a variant of the Raft algorithm
capable of achieving Byzantine Fault Tolerance. This allows
a total ordering of transactions across a cluster, necessary to
maintain transactional integrity in the eventuality of the failure
of any component of the system. This approach allows as
well to overcome any imperfect information on whether a
component has failed [27].
F. Secure transmission and storage
The transfer of any data to and from MOAI’s TEEs is done
via the internet using the Secretarium Connection Protocol
(SCP). The SCP is a variant of the Transport Layer Security
(TLS) 1.2 protocol [28]. As TLS, SCP guarantees a secure
channel permitting authentication, privacy and integrity/relia-
bility of the communication. In addition, SCP provides three
significant gains:
• It guarantees to end-users what application will be the
recipient of the data on the remote machine.
• It guarantees privacy and integrity against an adversary
with direct access to the remote machine, by providing
cryptographic proofs that the application runs in a trusted
execution environment.
• It provides protection against denial of service attacks
through.
To achieve a degree of protection against bruteforce denial of
service attacks (DoS) SCP relies on adaptive difficulty proof-
of-work challenges. After the client advertises its ephemeral
public key for the connection the server will decide of a
difficulty level for a proof-of-work calculation the client has
to compute. Multiple things can be included in the calculation
of the difficulty level such as the number of connection the
client attempts in a short period of time, the number of time
a particular route is accessed or how much payload is being
send over the connection.
Figure 2. A high-level schematic representation of the SCP protocol com-
munication between the MOAI App and the MOAI back end.
G. Federated Querying
MOAI proposes a web portal meant to be used by healthcare
workers and health authorities representatives to help identify
and communicate with participants potentially at risk. MOAI
does not offer direct access to its users’ related data. Instead, it
requires the investigator to enter the venue’s unique identifier
and a date and a time for the search. A set of identifier results
from the search, and the investigator can directly start a written
communication channel with the user on the other end. In
ensuring compatibility with the “NHS COVID-19” QRCodes,
we permit the search to be done via the NHS unique venue
ID only as MOAI does not extract the location information
encoded into QRCodes.
H. Technology stack
The back end of MOAI relies on a C++ Smart Contract
which runs within a Secretarium enclave on top of a Win-
dows Server. The mobile application and portal are written
in TypeScript using the ReactJS library. The mobile app is
packaged and made cross-platform Android and iOS via the
use of Expo.io. The front end portal is a standard HTTP server
on a linux machine.
I. Exposure level
The raw exposure risk would be difficult to understand for
most users as it doesn’t translate in a simple to understand
notion for them. Thus, we are translating this risk into a
simple four colour coded categories: low, medium, high and
very high. In addition to the improved user experience in
the app, the thresholds can be modulated per user based on
their profile risk using the users inputted risk factors. Those
risk factors fall into the three categories defined by the NHS
and detailed in Annex A. This approach allows us to send
a clear real-time feedback to the user with respect to their
exposure behaviour and hopefully positively influence their
attitude toward exposure risk. Figure 3 details the variable
threshold for the different categories of users. Because the
app is designed to be used by a broad population, we propose
an option to replace the red/green palette with a blue/orange
one to be more colour-blind-friendly. This option might seem
anecdotal but there are approximately 3 million colour blind
people in the UK alone (about 4.5% of the entire population).
III. QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN AND SYNTHETIC EXPOSURE
DATA GENERATION
A. Identified exposure risks from the literature
Currently available evidence indicates that COVID-19 may
be transmitted from person to person through several different
routes. Infection is understood to be mainly transmitted via
large respiratory droplets containing the COVID-19 virus. In
the review published by La Rosa et al. [29], COVID-19 pri-
marily transmits on a person-to-person contact mode through
respiratory droplets generated by expectoration (e.g. breathing
or sneezing), as well as contact (direct contact with an infected
subject or indirect contact from contaminated fomites). Deter-
mining particular places linked to clusters of cases could reveal
settings and factors responsible for amplifying the heterogene-
ity in transmission reported: potentially 80% of transmission
is being caused by only 10% of infected individuals [30].
Multiple outbreaks and clusters of COVID-19 have been
observed in a variety of indoor settings have been reported
since the start of the pandemic in the European Union, the
European Economic Area and the United Kingdom. Those
Figure 3. Risk levels with their associated threshold for the three categories
of users. At any given point in time, the users fall into on of the four categories
with their score (e.g. their risk of exposure) between 0 and 1 being computed
using our proposed model. Also displayed the adapted colour-scale for visually
impaired users.
combined countries reported 1377 clusters [31] of COVID-19
in occupational settings which occurred between March and
early July 2020. The main potential factors contributing to
clusters and outbreaks in occupational settings identified so
far are:
• Working in confined indoor spaces: Studies have shown
that in Europe >80% of working time is spent indoors.
Participating in meetings and sharing the same office
space has been reported in the literature as a risk factor for
contracting COVID-19 [32], [33]. Sharing facilities (e.g.
canteen and dressing rooms ), transports and accommo-
dations are likely contributing to transmission [34].
• Close/direct contact with COVID-19 cases: Many es-
sential workers are client-facing or near other coworkers
and thus at greater risk of occupational exposure than the
rest of the population. Healthcare workers are known to
be at substantial risk of occupational exposure to biolog-
ical agents. Based on UK Biobank data, Mutambudzi et
al. [35] has shown that the risk of healthcare workers
testing positive for COVID-19 was over seven times
higher than for non-essential workers, and those in social
care had a three times higher risk.
• Insufficient or incorrect use of protective personal
equipment (PPE): Many clusters and outbreaks were
linked to either insufficient access to PPE [36] or in-
adequate infection control and hygiene standards [37].
Studies [38]–[40] have demonstrated that the use of PPE
and physical distancing are successful at preventing infec-
tion even among the most at-risk group (e.g. healthcare
workers).
• “Presenteeism”: Impossibility to work remotely coupled
with financial constraints leading to continued commuting
and working, even when the employee is exhibiting
COVID-19 symptoms [37].
• Transmission from asymptomatic people: The absence
of symptoms in infected people can arise from two
different infection states: presymptomatic individuals and
individuals who never experience symptoms. It has been
demonstrated that asymptomatic persons could transmit
COVID-19 to others [41] and that transmission from
asymptomatic individuals was estimated to account for
more than half of all transmissions [42].
One last element that was left out of this list is the
potential influence of the airflow topology, in a given setting,
on transmission of COVID-19. For the same type of setting
and identical number of people, the humidity may influence
viral transmission by affecting how droplets/aerosols move
and their rate of decay, while the use of Heating, Ventilation
and Air-Conditioning systems (HVACs) may have a comple-
mentary role in decreasing potential airborne transmission of
COVID-19.
Earlier research indicates that humidity can influence indi-
viduals’ susceptibility to infection by affecting how droplets
and aerosols move and their rate of decay. Droplets are
usually categorised as larger entities (>5 µm) that rapidly
drop to the ground due to gravity, while aerosols are smaller
particles (≤ 5 µm) that rapidly evaporate in the air. Aerosols
leave behind droplet nuclei that are small enough and light
enough to remain suspended in the air for hours. According
to Zhao et al.’s model [43] droplets can travel three times
farther in low-temperature and high-humidity environment,
whereas the number of aerosol particles increases in warm, dry
environments. This research also highlighted the importance of
proper ventilation, as droplets and aerosol spread significantly
farther in air streams. In addition to the influence on the
spread of the droplets, a lower ambient humidity impacts
our respiratory immunity significantly by diminishing cilia’s
capability to expel viral aerosols [44]. The human ear, nose
and throat areas are more effective as virus fighter at higher
ambient humidity values rather than when room air is very
dry [45].
The importance of controlling quality (including humidity
and flow) can be achieved through different means, among
them HVACs. Some guidance around this have been pub-
lished by the various CDCs (UK, EU and US) [46]–[48] to
guide public policy. Those documents also highlighted the
known unknowns with respect to exposure risks in confined
indoor spaces. Among those unknowns, these documents have
highlighted the importance to improve ventilation in multi-
occupant spaces especially if temperature and humidity are
low ( risks of higher far-field aerosols as explained before)
and include activities that generate high levels of aerosol (e.g.
singing or physical exercise).
While assessing precisely the quality of airflow in a given
setting requires a lot of time and expert knowledge, it is
possible to assess it by proxy by leveraging Large scale users-
contributed observational data coupled with exposure investi-
gations carried out by the test and trace teams. That approach
could enable the collection of data that would otherwise be
extremely lengthy and costly to collect.
B. Questionnaire
A short and targeted questionnaire, embedded in an app,
is a straightforward means to collect data such as nature
of the building, density of people, ventilation type, length
of exposure and activity. The answers to the questionnaire
could be contributed by both the app users and venue owners
anonymously.
The questionnaire does collect granular timestamps (day and
time range for the hour) from the scanning into a venue but at
the granular level to mitigate any geolocation re-identification.
Furthermore, each venue has a unique random ID in place of
location data to preserve privacy.
To avoid any free text input, the questionnaire only contains
multiple choices questions which lowers the time needed by
the users to fill up the questionnaire, avoids invalid inputs and
enables more accurate modelling. This more straightforward
approach is inspired by recommendation systems and Netflix’s
change from a star rating to like/dislike approach.
The final exposure data contains 22 fields (see Table I)
that forms the basis for the training of the machine learning
algorithm for the platform.
The full questionnaire is available in Appendix C.
C. Synthetic data
In the context of this research, the design of the synthetic
data aims at reflecting the available contamination data from
the literature. In the absence of ground truth for the modelling,
the identified factors cannot be easily quantified independently
for the synthetic data. Therefore, we propose approximating it
by modelling it in a similar fashion to a Hidden Markov Model
(HMM) to estimate the exposure risk outcome. In this context,
the observed outcomes (positive outcome for an exposure)
with multiple hidden states (e.g. type of setting, airflow, etc.).
The search strategy to find publicly available information on
the contamination in different settings is inspired by Leclerc
et al. [49].
The exposure risk baseline for all settings is set at 10%. That
baseline is inferred from the statistics published by DHSC,
NHS Test and Trace statistics [50]. In addition to that baseline,
a modulation based on the identified risks from the literature
and a random noise value drawn from a Laplace distribution
Laplace(µ = 0, b = 0.5) is added.
Each question from the questionnaire is translated into
a categorical variable as the inputs as clearly defined and
restricted. In the future, in the eventuality of a collection of
real data, this would also allow us to display various statistics
to the researchers where each data point represents a scan by
Field Definition
TIMESTAMP Timestamp of the QRCode scan
UserID Unique random ID associated with a
user
Location Type NHS defined location types
Location Inside or Outside Clarify if location is indoor or outdoor
Number of People Present Estimated number of people present in
the location
Time Spent on Location Time spent at the location
Wearing Masks If people were wearing masks
Staff Properly Wearing PPE Staff properly wearing their PPE
People Properly Wearing PPE People properly wearing their PPE
Social Distancing Was the social distancing rules followed
Additional Measures in Place Additional protective measures imple-
mented at the place
Number of People in the Party Number of people in the party
All Members of Household Members were part of the household
All Members of Support Bubble Some members were not part of the
household but the bubble
Quality of the Airflow Estimation of the quality of the airflow
Temperature in Venue How was the relative temperature in the
venue
Humidity in Venue How was the relative humidity in the
venue
Clean after Every Usage Was the location cleaned after usage
Any Contact Between Members Any close contact with members of the
party (handshake, etc.)
Physical Activity Was the activity a physical or involved
extensive expectoration
Exposure Led to Contamination Outcome of the exposure (validated by
a test)
Risk of Contamination Risk of exposure
Table I
STRUCTURE OF AN EXPOSITION RECORD. ALL THE FIELDS ARE
CATEGORICAL VARIABLES WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE TIMESTAMP
WHICH IS A DATE AND USERID WHICH IS A RANDOM UUID GENERATED
FOR A GIVEN USER.
a user coupled with a COVID-19 test outcome (positive or
negative contamination).
IV. EXPOSURE RISK EVALUATION
In the absence of ground truth and actual data, the following
evaluations aim at providing an indication and groundwork for
future work. In the eventuality where actual data is collected,
we will re-evaluate those proposed models again and confirm
the validity of the proposed methodology.
A. Experimental design
To avoid potential unwanted side effects from the random
generation of the synthetic data, we generated twice five
different data sets containing 150k, 250k, 500, 750k and 1M
records, respectively. Then, we split the generated data set
into a training set containing 70% of the data and a test set
containing the remaining 30%. We tuned the hyperparameters
using the training data sets and applied cross-validation with
k-folds within this sub data set, where k was set to 10.
Specifically, in each fold, we used recordings from Nr –
(Nr/k) to train the model, and from the remaining Nr/k
subjects to test the trained model, where Nr is the number
of records in the data set. This process was repeated k-times
so that all of the recordings were tested. The hyperparameter
tuning and calibration of the models was done using a random
grid search that optimised primarily the accuracy of the model
and secondary the F1–score. The test set was used to compute
the final performances of the proposed models and validating
the choice. All computed the performance metrics will be
discussed in IV-D.
In order to check the predictive capability of our selected
features, we have selected and tested different classification
algorithms, including Logistic Regression, Naive Bayes, Ridge
Regression [51], Ada Boost [52], Linear Discriminant Anal-
ysis, Random Forests [53], Light Gradient Boosting Ma-
chine [54], Gradient Boosting Classifier [55] and Extreme
Gradient Boosting [56].
B. Implementation
During the exploration and discovery phase, we extensively
relied on PyCaret [57] to evaluate the best models. This library
allows us to speed up the code writing, training, tuning and
validation of the different models by delegating the tasks
to the CPU or GPU (whenever available) seamlessly and
providing a single programmatic interface to all the models.
The training time for each training fold ranged from a few
hundred milliseconds to approximately five minutes on the
node for the 1M records data set. The tuning of the top 5
best performing models during training would take less than
2 hours for the 1M records data set.
C. The proposed exposure model
Our proposed model to measure the risk exposure for a
given individual at any given time t is as follow:





where P is the probability of exposure at the current time
time t, n is the number of exposures (e.g. number of scans done
by the user at a setting), Pn is the probability of exposure at
the given setting and e−λδ(t,tn) the weight decay with t the
current time, tn the time when the exposure occurred, λ the
decay constant and the function δ defined as:
δ(x, y) =
{
0 if (x - y) ≤ 2 days
(x - y - 2880) if (x - y) > 2 days
The function δ is a function of time in minutes where 2880
represents the number of minutes in two days. In the context
of this research, a systematic review has shown [58] that the
incubation period pour COVID-19 ranges from 2 to 14 days
with a mean serial interval estimated to be 5.2. Hence, the
decay of probability can only start from the earliest incubation
possible and the choice of lambda should reflect that.
The public statistics from [50] gives us an indication on
the potential ratio of potential positive tests versus negative
tests outcomes linked to at least one close contact. Thus,
we consider our data to be relatively balanced (we would
select the same number tests which are coming out negative
than positive), Accuracy is a proper metric to measure the
performance of the models but additional such as F1 measure
and AUC can give further insights on the performance of our
model during the evaluation.
D. Final model selection
1) Performance metrics: The evaluation of the trained mod-
els on the test data sets (from the 150k, 250k, 500, 750k and
1M records data sets) consistently ranked Ada Boost, Light
Gradient Boosting Machine, Linear Discriminant Analysis,
Logistic Regression and Ridge Regression as the best five
performers with respect to the metrics chosen. Table II shows
the average performances of the various models on the test
data sets. The performances of the Light Gradient Boosting
Machine, Logistic Regression and Linear Discriminant Analy-
sis are overall extremely close, but we selected Light Gradient
Boosting Machine for this project to be implemented in the
enclave into the platform.
2) Impact of the hyperparameters: We looked at the im-
pact of hyperparameters on the performances of the selected
model. For this, we used 5-fold cross-validation and calculated
optimised values for: a) the number of iterations, b) the
maximum depth of each tree at each step, c) the learning
rate, d) the maximum number of features. The tuning of the
hyperparameters aimed to maximise the Accuracy score of the
model on the training set.
3) Selection of the Lambda: A small grid search of λ
between 0.00005 to 0.0005 with steps of size 0.0001, yielded
λ = 0.0001 as an adequate value for our proposed model.
V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
The MOAI platform aims to provide a fully transparent
implementation of practical contact tracing with research end-
points employing TEE as a base. Nevertheless, there are some
identified gaps in the platform. We aim to address them as the
next step in future work.
The current MOAI implementation relies on an old version
of the SCP that does not support the smart contract to be re-
sponsible for encrypting the data it exchanges with the mobile
client application, the web portal or a third party auditing tool.
As such, the Secretarium engine is implicitly trusted to handle
decryption of the payload and offloading to the smart contract.
This is a limitation of the current implementation as the code
of the Secretarium engine is not publicly available. Moreover,
the code authenticity controls useful for checking the validity
of the TEE’s computation against the open-sourced smart
contract is not immediately present and available from the
Secretarium platform. Therefore, the general public cannot be
sure the computation followed the prescription. Work is on the
way to enable a split header/payload encryption mechanism
within the SCP protocol. Future work on MOAI to leverage
this capability would address the limitation on trust and permit
complete cryptographic control of the computation. Also, this
work would enable proper authenticity validation checks.
It is worth mentioning that beyond the current technical
limitations linked to the MOAI platform at the time of writing,
there are intrinsic limitations to a unique ID venue-based tag
scanning. It is possible to attack the system by copying QR
Codes and placing copies in different locations or venues.
While it would not render these type of systems ineffective, it
can affect their performances the more such frauds are carried
Model Accuracy AUC Recall Precision F1 Kappa MCC
Light Gradient Boosting Machine 0.697 0.755 0.749 0.651 0.697 0.354 0.358
Logistic Regression 0.697 0.755 0.743 0.653 0.695 0.354 0.357
Linear Discriminant Analysis 0.696 0.755 0.706 0.664 0.684 0.354 0.355
Ridge Classifier 0.691 0 0.706 0.664 0.684 0.354 0.355
Ada Boost Classifier 0.676 0.756 0.783 0.642 0.705 0.354 0.363
Gradient Boosting Classifier 0.676 0.754 0.820 0.634 0.715 0.354 0.370
Extreme Gradient Boosting 0.675 0.754 0.705 0.662 0.683 0.351 0.352
Random Forest Classifier 0.648 0.705 0.631 0.649 0.640 0.297 0.297
Naive Bayes 0.618 0.721 0.318 0.782 0.452 0.232 0.288
Table II
COMPARISON OF THE PERFORMANCES BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT MODELS EVALUATED
out. Being located in publicly available locations, there are no
known mechanisms to prevent or fight such tempering.
VI. CONCLUSION
The approach presented in this paper is intended to propose
a systematic approach to observational data collection at scale
with the general public’s involvement without relying on
sensors. Relying on laymen presents a challenge as the tools
to enable the collection need to be readily available and the
questionnaires easy to understand and quick to answer to en-
courage participants to contribute. Another key challenge is to
demonstrate the trustworthiness of the proposed platform. The
protection of everyone’s privacy while enabling researchers to
carry out valuable research is paramount. One reason the first
version of the NHS Test and Trace app failed to be adopted by
the public was partially because of that lack of transparency on
how the collected data would be processed [59], the security of
the data (both in terms of who gets access to the data and under
what conditions) and most importantly the absence of control
over that data in the long run. MOAI aims to address those
concerns by giving back control to the users and complete
transparency on what data is collected, how it will be used,
and whom.
Finally, the proposed model relies on an extensive literature
review available at the time. The synthetic data provides in-
sights on how some factors contribute to higher contamination
but do not constitute definite proof. Nonetheless, it provides
an indicator to the public and raises awareness on the risks
of exposure in the context of this pandemic. The inclusion of
that risk model in an easy to use environment could prove
a valuable tool to encourage the adoption of safe behaviours.
The continuous and safe collection of data will also enable the
researchers to improve the proposed model in near real-time
ultimately leading to better policies and a better understanding
of the contamination patterns.
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Preliminary questions to be answered once in the app
based on NHS’s own classification.
Risk factors:
Do you have any of the following risk factors:
• have had an organ transplant
• are having chemotherapy or antibody treatment for can-
cer, including immunotherapy
• are having an intense course of radiotherapy (radical
radiotherapy) for lung cancer
• are having targeted cancer treatments that can affect the
immune system (such as protein kinase inhibitors or
PARP inhibitors)
• have blood or bone marrow cancer (such as leukaemia,
lymphoma or myeloma)
• have had a bone marrow or stem cell transplant in the past
6 months, or are still taking immunosuppressant medicine
• have been told by a doctor you have a severe lung
condition (such as cystic fibrosis, severe asthma or severe
COPD)
• have a condition that means they have a very high risk
of getting infections (such as SCID or sickle cell)
• are taking medicine that makes them much more likely
to get infections (such as high doses of steroids or
immunosuppressant medicine)
• have a serious heart condition and are pregnant
• are an adult with Down’s syndrome
• are an adult who is having dialysis or has severe (stage
5) long-term kidney disease
• have been classed as clinically extremely vulnerable,




If yes, then High risk
Do you have any of the following risk factors:
• are 70 or older
• have a lung condition that’s not severe (such as asthma,
COPD, emphysema or bronchitis)
• have heart disease (such as heart failure)
• have diabetes
• have chronic kidney disease
• have liver disease (such as hepatitis)
• have a condition affecting the brain or nerves (such
as Parkinson’s disease, motor neurone disease, multiple
sclerosis or cerebral palsy)
• have a condition that means they have a high risk of
getting infections
• are taking medicine that can affect the immune system
(such as low doses of steroids)





If yes, then Moderate Risk
Anything else can be classified as Low Risk
APPENDIX B
NHS LOCATION TYPES
NHS location types from https://www.gov.uk/create-
coronavirus-qr-poster :
1) Accommodation. For example, bed and breakfasts and
campsites
2) Childcare In public and private settings
3) Education Including universities
4) Events and conference space
5) Finance and professional service. For example, high
street banks and real estate agencies
6) Medical facility. For example, hospitals, GP practices
and veterinary clinics
7) Non-residential institution. For example, community
centres, libraries, crematoria and funeral homes
8) Office location and workspace
9) Personal care. For example, hair salons and barbers, spas
and beauty salons
10) Place of worship. For example, churches, synagogues,
mosques, temples and meeting rooms
11) Private event
12) Recreation and leisure. For example, cinemas, theatres,
museums and galleries
13) Rental / hire locations
14) Residential care. For example, care and nursing homes
15) Restaurant, cafe, pub or bar
16) Retail shops
17) Sports and fitness facilities. For example, gyms, indoor
sports facilities, swimming pools





Indoor: 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 18
Can be both inside or outside: 7, 13, 15, 17, 19
Question for location type that can be both inside or outside:
1) What was the location type?
a. Indoor
b. Outdoor
Questions for all locations




















If no: was the staff wearing any form of PPE?
If yes: were people using the PPE correctly? (e.g. covering
both the nose and mouth)
4) Were people following the social distancing rules?
a. Yes
b. No
5) Were additional protection were put in place (e.g.
one-way systems, walled separators at tills, etc.)?
a. Yes
b. no
if Yes: can you please describe it in a few words









8) Were all the members from your support bubble?
a. Yes
b. No
9) How was the air flow?
a. Well ventilated (doors or windows open, large inside space
e.g. museums, etc.)
b. No natural ventilation and air conditioning or heating was
present and very likely to be working
c. The air was circulating a lot from unknown source
d. Confined space with no apparent ventilation
10) How was the temperature in the venue?
a. Felt warm (above 25 degrees Celsius)
b. Normal room temperature (between 20 and 25 degrees
Celsius)
c. Felt cold (below 19 degrees Celsius)
11) How was the humidity in the venue?
a. Identical to outside
b. Dryer than outside
c. More humid than outside
Question for venues 1, 4, 5, 8, 10, 15, 17, 18
1) Were the surfaces cleaned after every usage?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Often but not after every usage
Questions for outdoor:




2) Did it involve singing or physical activities?
a. Yes
b. No
